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CORRUPTION CASES AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
I.	INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the South African Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of
Appeal, and several High Courts have served as anti-corruption fighters. Some of
the judicial rulings are extraordinary in scope. In Glenister v. President of South Africa
(Glenister II), the Constitutional Court invalidated the existence of an independent
government entity designed to fight corruption because the entity was too weak.1
Another Constitutional Court decision nullified a presidential appointment to a
national prosecuting position because of the President’s unwillingness to pay heed to
the appointee’s integrity problems.2
In Nkabinde v. Judicial Service Commission, the South Gauteng High Court
allowed an important disciplinary investigation involving Western Cape High Court
Judge John Hlophe’s alleged ex parte tampering with two Constitutional Court
Justices, in a legal matter that implicated President Jacob Zuma, to go forward. 3 And
in Democratic Alliance v. Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (the “Spy Tapes”
case), the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the Democratic Alliance had the
right to examine documents and audiotapes that explained why an investigation into
possible financial corruption by Zuma was halted.4
These decisions reveal a risky yet important role for courts in a “dominant party
democracy” in which the African National Congress’s (ANC) dominance is one
source of corruption.5 Moreover, the ANC has criticized the Constitutional Court
on several occasions.6 In 2012, the Department of Justice and Constitutional
Development authorized an academic study to consider whether the Court has been
sufficiently transformative.7 Many suspect the study was an excuse to further criticize
1.

2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at para. 248.

2.

See Democratic All. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) at paras. 86–89. The
appointee, Menzi Simelane, was found to have made false allegations against the previous National
Director of Public Prosecutions during the Ginwala Commission. Id. at paras. 50–53.

3.

2014 (12) BCLR 1477 (GJ) at paras. 1–3, 93, 121–23. A full bench of the High Court subsequently
affirmed the decision. Ernest Mabuza, Ruling Paves Way For Conduct Tribunal to Investigate Judge
Hlophe, Bus. Day (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/law/2014/11/21/ruling-pavesway-for-conduct-tribunal-to-investigate-judge-hlophe. The two Constitutional Court Justices have
now sought a judgment reversing that decision from the Supreme Court of Appeal, which will further
delay the matter. See Franny Rabkin, Top Judges Seek to Appeal, Bus. Day (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.
bdlive.co.za/national/law/2015/01/21/top-judges-seek-to-appeal.

4.

2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) at paras. 37, 52. The Democratic Alliance is an opposing party to the ANC, the
current dominant political party. Id. at para. 2.

5.

See Sujit Choudhry, ‘He Had a Mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National
Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy, 2 Const. Ct. Rev. 1, 3 (2009); Zuma, ANC in ‘Eternal
Corruption Scheme,’ News24 (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/ZumaANC-in-eternal-corruption-scheme-20141010.

6.

For examples of ANC criticisms, see Hamadziripi Tamukamoyo, Double Speak About Judicial Reform in
South Africa Raises Alarm Bells, ISS Africa (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/doublespeak-about-judicial-reform-in-south-africa-raises-alarm-bells.

7.

See Dep’t of Just. and Const. Dev., Discussion Document on the Transformation of the
Judicial System and the Role of the Judiciary in the Developmental South African State
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the Court.8 This raises the question of whether the courts have gone too far in these
cases, especially given their democratic fragility and given that courts in other
countries would likely not have been so bold. In addition, some scholars have
commented on the supposed weakness of the judicial reasoning in these cases,9 which
makes them even more controversial.
Part II.A of this essay examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s handling of various
scandals, particularly Watergate and the situations involving Whitewater and Monica
Lewinsky, that have parallels to the allegations that Zuma participated in criminal
financial misconduct10 and committed sexual assault.11 Comparisons of the structural
features of constitutions are difficult, but it is still useful to note that high-level
corruption is not merely a developing country problem. Part II.B looks at the
scholarly criticisms of Glenister II. Part II.C argues that the South African courts
must play an active role in combatting corruption for pragmatic reasons, at least for
the time being. Part III concludes the paper.
II.	The Court as Corruption Fighter

A. The U.S. Example

If the U.S. Supreme Court received a claim, akin to that in Glenister II, that a
national anti-corruption body was too weak, the Court would likely dismiss the case,
either for lack of standing12 or under the political question doctrine.13 Similarly, a
lawsuit alleging that a U.S. President did not deliberate sufficiently over a Cabinet
appointee’s supposed lack of integrity—as in Democratic Alliance v. President of the
(Feb. 2012), http://www.justice.gov.za/docs/other-docs/20120228-transf-jud.pdf. To my knowledge,
the academic review of whether the Constitutional Court is transformative enough is still ongoing.
8.

See, e.g., Pierre de Vos, Mixed Signals on the Review of our Courts, Constitutionally Speaking (Feb.
29, 2012), http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/mixed-signals-on-the-review-of-our-courts/.

9.

See K. Malan, Reassessing Judicial Independence and Impartiality Against the Backdrop of Judicial
Appointments in South Africa, 17 Potchefstroom Electronic L.J., 2014, at 1964, 2010–14, http://
www.nwu.ac.za/sites/www.nwu.ac.za/files/files/p-per/issuepages/2014volume17no5/2014%2817%295
Malan.pdf; see also infra notes 62–65.

10.

David Smith, Jacob Zuma Accused of Corruption ‘on a Grand Scale’ in South Africa, The Guardian (Nov.
29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/29/jacob-zuma-accused-corruption-southafrica.

11.

Jacob Zuma Cleared of Rape, The Guardian (May 8, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/
may/08/aids.southafrica.

12.

The U.S. doctrine of standing requires that a plaintiff allege “personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). The entity in Glenister II purportedly lacked adequate power as
opposed to having excess authority that could injure someone.

13.

The U.S. political question doctrine renders a question before a court non-justiciable when there is a
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it,” among other factors. Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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Republic of South Africa14 —would likely be dismissed as a political question. But other
U.S. Supreme Court cases have ruled on issues of separation of powers and corruption.
One U.S. Supreme Court case that actually links the scandals that enveloped
President Richard M. Nixon (Watergate) and President William J. Clinton
(Whitewater/Lewinsky) is Morrison v. Olson.15 Congress enacted Title VI of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (the “Independent Counsel Act”) because Nixon
had fired Archibald Cox, the first special prosecutor investigating his involvement in
the Watergate scandal, and it had been difficult to find another independent attorney
to continue.16 Moreover, the second special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, was also
vulnerable to losing his position, though he eventually obtained the audiotapes that
were the key to Nixon’s demise in the Supreme Court case of United States v. Nixon.17
After Watergate, the Independent Counsel Act authorized the U.S. Attorney
General to initially investigate and report to a three-judge panel whether there was
sufficient reason to appoint such a counsel, who could not be fired except for cause.18
In Morrison, the Court addressed the President’s power under Article II of the
U.S. Constitution.19 The issue was whether the Independent Counsel position
violated separation of powers, as the appointee did not fit neatly into the prosecutorial
hierarchy of the executive branch and had significant unchecked power.20
Article II of the U.S. Constitution differentiates between “inferior” and
“principal” executive officers in the federal government.21 The President appoints
principal officers upon the Senate’s advice and consent, which requires approval by a
majority of the Senate.22 Principal officers also serve at the will of the President, who
can generally remove them with or without cause, given the importance of an
administration’s ability to work effectively on important matters.23 Under Article II,
14.

2013 (1) SA 248 (CC).

15.

487 U.S. 654 (1988).

16.

Carol Elder Bruce, An Independent Counsel Law Needs to be Restored, N.Y. Times: The Opinion Pages
Room for Debate (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-anygood-come-of-watergate/an-independent-counsel-law-needs-to-be-restored; Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon
Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, Wash. Post (Oct. 21, 1973), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.htm. Cox’s firing is
similar to the ANC government’s decision to disband the powerful Scorpions anti-corruption unit in
that Cox and the Scorpions were both removed by political foes being investigated for corruption or
scandal. Scorpions Stung: South Africa’s Special Crime-Busting Team May Be On Its Way Out, The
Economist (May 8, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/11333160.

17.

418 U.S. 683 (1974). This echoes the audiotapes controversy in the South African Spy Tapes case. See
Spy Tapes: Scorpions Boss Wanted to Charge Zuma, Mail & Guardian (Sept. 28, 2014), http://mg.co.za/
article/2014-09-28-spy-tapes-scorpions-boss-wanted-to-charge-zuma-report.

18.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–63, 661 n.3.

19.

Id. at 659–60.

20. Id.
21.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–72.

22. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–72.
23. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688–90.
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“Congress may . . . vest the [a]ppointment of . . . inferior [o]fficers . . . in the President
. . . the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”24 A high-ranking member
of the President’s Cabinet, such as the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
would likely be an example of a principal officer.25 By contrast, the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of Iowa, who is under the supervision and domain
of the U.S. Attorney General, would likely be deemed an inferior officer due to the
position’s limited authority.26
Under the Independent Counsel Act, the U.S. Attorney General did not exercise
the same authority over the Independent Counsel that it exercised over U.S.
Attorneys, and the Independent Counsel usually had just one target and virtually
unlimited resources. 27 Moreover, members of the judicial branch, rather than the
executive branch, selected the Independent Counsel.28 The Supreme Court upheld
the law based on several technical grounds and on the equitable need to have someone
independent to investigate high-ranking officials.29 The Court therefore decided the
restrictions on the President’s ability to remove an Independent Counsel under the
Independent Counsel Act were permitted and noted that there were other relatively
independent agencies in existence.30
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered a powerful lone dissent arguing that the
Independent Counsel had the power of a principal officer under Article II and that
the Independent Counsel Act’s appointment and removal mechanisms were not
reconcilable with the three branches of government. 31 Scalia wrote that the
Independent Counsel was essentially outside the executive branch.32 Moreover, Scalia
was concerned that unlike ordinary prosecutors, the Independent Counsel would
have virtually unlimited funds to focus on one or two main targets. 33
The Independent Counsel Act subsequently became an issue during the Clinton
presidency when Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr aggressively investigated both
the Whitewater real estate deal and the allegations that Clinton had committed
perjury about having sexual relations with then-White House intern Monica

24.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.

25.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services is appointed by the President in accordance with the
advice and consent procedure under Article II. See The Executive Branch, The White House, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/1600/executive-branch (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).

26. E.g., United States v. Rijo, 87 F. Supp. 2d 69, 70 (D. P.R. 2000) (“United States Attorneys . . . have

consistently been held to be inferior officers . . . .”).

27.

See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–83.

28. Id. at 661, 677.
29. See id. at 696–97.
30. Id. at 687–97.
31.

Id. at 697–734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

32.

Id. at 703, 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

33. Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Lewinsky.34 A pending civil lawsuit by Paula Jones alleging that Clinton had sexually
harassed her when she was a state employee during his tenure as Governor of
Arkansas35 opened the door to more Lewinsky evidence.36 In Clinton v. Jones, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Jones civil lawsuit could proceed despite Clinton’s
efforts to seek a stay or a form of immunity.37 The Court determined that the lawsuit
would not unduly interfere with the President’s functions.38 Unlike the sexual assault
case in which Zuma was controversially acquitted,39 however, no criminal prosecution
was brought against Clinton for his alleged sexual overtures towards Jones.40 In the
end, Starr spent over forty million dollars in public funds and the U.S. Senate
acquitted Clinton during impeachment proceedings.41 Clinton remains popular
today,42 and Zuma’s ANC remains dominant.43 The Independent Counsel Act expired
in 1999, and in retrospect, some liberal scholars believe, Scalia’s dissent in Morrison
was right.44
Admittedly, there is a key distinction between the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis
of the Independent Counsel Act and the anti-corruption entity at issue in Glenister
II. One of the constitutional issues in Morrison was whether the Independent Counsel
was too powerful.45 By contrast, the issue in Glenister II was whether the entity was
sufficiently strong or independent.46 But both cases shed light on how their respective
judiciaries have policed corruption.

34. See Ken Gormley, The Death of American Virtue: Clinton vs. Starr 213, 407 (2010).
35.

See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).

36. See Peter Baker, Clinton Denied Initiating Job Help for Lewinsky, Wash. Post (Mar. 5, 1998), https://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/jones030598.htm.

37.

520 U.S. at 705–06.

38. Id. at 708.
39. S. Africa’s Zuma Cleared of Rape, BBC News (May 8, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4750731.stm.
40. See Josh Gerstein, Clinton Eligible, Once Again, to Practice Law, N.Y. Sun (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.

nysun.com/national/clinton-eligible-once-again-to-practice-law/25965/.

41.

Naftali Bendavid & James Warren, Hubbell Deals with Starr, Agrees to Plead Guilty to Cover-up Charge,
Chi. Trib. (June 29, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-06-29/news/9906290100_1_
webster-hubbell-hillary-clinton-castle-grande.

42.

See Matt Berman, Bill Clinton is the Best Friend Democrats Have for 2014, Nat’l J. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://
www.nationaljournal.com/politics/bill-clinton-is-the-best-friend-democrats-have-for-2014-20140312.

43.

See Presidents of the African National Congress, African Nat’l Congress, www.anc.org.za/show.
php?id=3999 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (showing President Zuma’s 2012 election to a second term
ending in 2017).

44. See Tasha Vincent, The Evolution of Witch Hunting?: The Life and Death of the Independent Counsel Act,

Infoplease, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/indepcounsel1.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).

45.

See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988).

46. 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at paras. 160, 163.
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B. Glenister II

Several scholars have criticized the Glenister II majority’s legal reasoning—but
here the critics are wrong. This section will examine these criticisms and Glenister
II’s likely legacy, especially in light of further judicial developments.
In Glenister II, the Constitutional Court addressed the independence of a new
prosecutorial entity, the Hawks.47 The Hawks were created because a powerful anticorruption unit, known as the Scorpions—that had been located in the relatively
independent National Prosecuting Authority48—was disbanded just at it appeared to
be preparing an indictment against Zuma for financial improprieties.49 The Court
ruled that the Hawks—who now came under the supervision of the Minister of
Police—were not independent enough for predominantly two reasons: (1) the chances
for government interference in their mission, and (2) the lack of meaningful job
security.50
The most controversial part of Glenister II was the Constitutional Court’s
emphasis on how various international conventions required a more independent
anti-corruption agency.51 The Court specifically cited the United Nations (UN)
Convention against Corruption,52 which states, “[e]ach State Party shall grant the
body [tasked with preventing corruption] . . . the necessary independence . . . to carry
out its . . . functions effectively and free from any undue influence.”53 What transformed
the issues in Glenister II into constitutional issues rather than international law and
policy issues? The Court found that international law influenced how the relevant
Bill of Rights provisions should be interpreted.54 Thus, the majority ruled that the
Hawks’ lack of independence violated section 7 of the Constitution, because “[t]he
state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights,”55 and

47.

Id. at para. 160.

48. The National Prosecuting Authority was created by section 179 of the South African Constitution for

the purpose of conducting criminal trials on behalf of the state. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 179.

49. See Mmanaledi Mataboge & Lionel Faull, Scorpions Disbanding Unconstitutional, Mail & Guardian

(Mar. 18, 2011), http://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-18-scorpions-disbanding-unconstitutional; Wendell
Roelf, South Africa’s Scorpion Crimefighters to be Disbanded, Reuters, (Feb. 12, 2008, 11:19 A.M.), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/12/us-safrica-scorpions-idUSL1223114320080212. A Zuma confidant
had already been convicted in a related case involving the arms scandal. Mataboge & Faull, supra.

50. See Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at para. 248. For example, even the Hawks’ salaries were decided by the

officials they might investigate. Id. at para. 227.

51.

Id. at paras. 179–202.

52.

Id. at para. 183.

53.

G.A. Res. 58/4, annex, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 6, ¶ 2 (adopted Oct. 31,
2003), https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.
pdf. South Africa is a signatory to the Convention. Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at para. 85 & n.64
(Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).

54. Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at paras. 192–94, 201– 02.
55.

Id. at paras. 166–78, 194, 200 (quoting S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 7(2)).
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noted that corruption undermines democracy, dignity, equality, freedom, and the
rule of law.56
According to the Glenister II dissent, however, the establishment of the Hawks
was a parliamentary policy matter that the Court could not second-guess if the entity
met basic elements of independence.57 The dissent maintained that whether the
Hawks were as independent as the Scorpions was irrelevant and that the focus should
be on rationality, not retrogression (a comparison with the prior institution).58
Moreover, international law did not bind the government because the conventions
were not self-executing.59 The dissent further argued that the majority misinterpreted
international law since international law supposedly did not require the anti-corruption
entity to have as much independence as the majority had ruled.60 It was a rare, closely
divided, 5–4 decision, akin to the U.S. Supreme Court’s most controversial cases.61
Scholars like Samuel Issacharoff,62 Theunis Roux,63 and Ziyad Motala64 have
criticized the Glenister II Court’s purportedly confused reasoning and reliance on
international law. Motala virtually accuses the Court of lawlessness.65 Pierre de Vos,66
George Devenish, 67 and Justice Edwin Cameron 68 have authored defenses.
Determining the correctness of the criticism requires an analysis of how international
law was used in Glenister II. One of the most detailed scholarly examinations is by
Juha Tuovinen, who argues that both the majority and the dissent were wrong.69 First,
a little background.
56. Id. at para. 170.
57.

Id. at paras. 65–68 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).

58. Id. at paras. 59, 68, 73 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting). The majority disagreed by pointing out how

retrogression affected public perceptions of corruption in the democracy. Id. at paras. 209–10.

59.

Id. at paras. 85–99 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).

60. Id. at paras. 117–24 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).
61.

See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012).

62. Samuel Issacharoff, The Democratic Risk to Democratic Transitions, 5 Const. Ct. Rev. 1, 27–30 (2013).
63. Theunis Roux, The South African Constitutional Court’s Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, 5 Const. Ct.

Rev. 33, 69–70 (2013).

64. Ziyad Motala, Divination Through a Strange Lens, Times Live (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.timeslive.

co.za/opinion/columnists/2011/03/26/divination-through-a-strange-lens.

65.

Id.

66. Pierre de Vos, How Not to Criticise a Court Judgment, Constitutionally Speaking (Mar. 28, 2011),

http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/how-not-to-criticise-a-court-judgment/.

67.

George Devenish, The Scorpions vs The Hawks – A Royal Battle, IFAISA (Aug. 11, 2010), http://
accountabilitynow.org.za/scorpions-vs-hawks-royal-battle/.

68. Edwin Cameron, Constitutionalism, Rights, and International Law: The Glenister Decision, 23 Duke J.

Comp. & Int’l L. 389 (2013).

69. Juha Tuovinen, The Role of International Law in Constitutional Adjudication: Glenister v President of the

Republic of South Africa, 130 SALJ 661 (2013).
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The South African Constitution is dualist in that the President may enter into
treaties on behalf of the nation, but the treaties are not self-executing.70 The treaties
must be ratified by Parliament, and implementing legislation makes them binding
law.71 South Africa also has a unique constitutional provision, section 39, which
specifies that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court . . . must consider
international law; and . . . may consider foreign law.”72 Thus, international law can be
binding statutory law in South Africa or instead, it can provide interpretive guidance
regarding the Constitution. These two functions differ, especially since the
interpretive role has a significant discretionary and constitutional component.
Tuovinen argues that the Glenister II majority failed to make clear how they used
international law to reach their decision.73 For example, the majority, jointly authored
by Justice Cameron and Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke, confusingly used
different terms to describe the impact of international law.74 Moreover, neither
international law nor South African legislation explicitly requires a fully autonomous
and independent anti-corruption agency.75 In addition, South Africa’s executive
branch signed and approved certain major international anti-corruption conventions,
but they had not apparently been ratified by Parliament or enacted into domestic
law.76 These are powerful arguments.
Tuovinen also criticizes the dissent for its view that these international conventions
have virtually no impact and that establishing the Hawks was purely a domestic
parliamentary policy decision.77 He argues that the dissent’s position is inconsistent with
the Constitution’s discussion of the potentially “binding” or interpretive impact of
international law.78 In the end, he advocates for the Court to adopt a dialogical approach
in which international law is fully considered and the substantive reasons for allowing it
to influence constitutional law are fleshed out comprehensively.79 Tuovinen believes that
both the majority and the dissent failed to do this.80
While the majority’s explanations of how it relied on international law vary in
degree of merit, Tuovinen goes too far in saying the majority failed to engage in
70. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 231.
71.

Id. This is similar to many countries, including the United States.

72. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 39(1)(b)–(c).
73. Tuovinen, supra note 69, at 664–67. For more of Tuovinen’s scholarly examination of the Glenister II

decision, see Juha Tuovinen, What to Do with International Law? Three Flaws in Glenister, 5 Const. Ct.
Rev. 434 (2013).

74.

Tuovinen, supra note 69, at 665–66.

75. Id. at 662.
76. Id. at 662–66.
77.

See id. at 667– 69; see also Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at paras. 99–103 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).

78. See Tuovinen, supra note 69, at 668– 69, 671–72.
79. See id. at 671–72.
80. Id. at 669, 671–72. Tuovinen acknowledges, however, that the varied anti-corruption conventions at

issue require South Africa to have an anti-corruption entity with some level of independence. Id. at 662.
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sufficient substantive reasoning.81 I view the Court’s use of international law as
falling into the category of clarifying the meaning of various other constitutional
provisions. Indeed, the majority made a strong and comprehensive argument about
why international law should be constitutionally influential.82
For example, the Constitutional Court pointed out that when South Africa
signed the UN Convention against Corruption, then-Minister for the Public Service
and Administration Geraldine J. Fraser-Moleketi said:
Corruption is a common feature in all political systems, despite the differences
that may exist in their governing philosophies or their geography. Nationstates are increasingly aware that corruption presents a serious threat to their
core principles and values, and hinders social and economic development. As
a result, there has been a growing acceptance of the need to address the
problem in a coordinated, comprehensive and sustainable way.83

If anything, the Minister’s assertions amount to drastic understatement given the
scope of the governmental corruption problem. The New York Times Magazine even
ran a feature story on corruption in South Africa and the country’s new female Public
Protector.84 South Africa is also a signatory to the African Union Convention (which
condemns corruption) and to the Southern African Development Community
Protocol against Corruption.85
South Africa’s own Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act is
designed to implement international conventions such as the UN Convention against
Corruption.86 The Constitutional Court eventually described four specific parts of
the South African Constitution that demonstrate that key anti-corruption
international law principles are embraced in South African law.87
The Court then linked international law and the Constitution even more
explicitly:
81.

Another scholar agrees. See Bonita Meyersfeld, Domesticating International Standards: The Direction of
International Human Rights Law in South Africa, 5 Const. Ct. Rev. 398, 407 (2013) (approving of the
Court’s statement that it is “appropriating” international law). But see Franziska Sucker, Approval of an
International Treaty in Parliament: How Does Section 231(2) ‘Bind the Republic’?, 5 Const. Ct. Rev. 416,
422–23, 429–33 (2013) (critiquing Glenister II’s lack of substantive reasoning).

82. See Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at paras. 170–202. The more than twenty paragraphs of analysis

regarding the relationship between international law and the Constitution certainly satisfy the need for
substantive reasoning.

83. Id. at para. 168 (quoting Geraldine J. Fraser-Moleketi, Minister for the Public Service and
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Convention against Corruption (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www.un.org/webcast/merida/statements/
safri_2031209en.htm).
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The obligations in these Conventions are clear and they are unequivocal. They
impose on the Republic the duty in international law to create an anticorruption unit that has the necessary independence. That duty exists not only
in the international sphere, and is enforceable not only there. Our Constitution
appropriates the obligation for itself, and draws it deeply into its heart, by
requiring the state to fulfil it in the domestic sphere. In understanding how it
does so, the starting point is section 7(2), which requires the state to respect,
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. This Court has
held that in some circumstances this provision imposes a positive obligation on
the state and its organs “to provide appropriate protection to everyone through
laws and structures designed to afford such protection.” Implicit in section 7(2)
is the requirement that the steps the state takes to respect, protect, promote
and fulfil constitutional rights must be reasonable and effective.88

The Court further elaborated:

That the Republic is bound under international law to create an anti-corruption
unit with appropriate independence is of the foremost interpretive significance
in determining whether the state has fulfilled its duty to respect, protect,
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, as section 7(2) requires.
Section 7(2) implicitly demands that the steps the state takes must be
reasonable. To create an anti-corruption unit that is not adequately independent
would not constitute a reasonable step. In reaching this conclusion, the fact
that section 231(2) provides that an international agreement that Parliament
ratifies “binds the Republic” is of prime significance. It makes it unreasonable
for the state, in fulfilling its obligations under section 7(2), to create an anticorruption entity that lacks sufficient independence.89

This reasoning repudiates Tuovinen’s contention that the Court’s majority lacked
sufficient “substantive reasoning” to justify its strict anti-corruption interpretation of
international law and the Constitution.90 Additionally, the majority provided fortythree paragraphs on the Hawks’ deficiencies.91 This is more than adequate substantive
reasoning.
C. A Pragmatic Legal Coda

I add a pragmatic legal argument in favor of Glenister II: The majority’s approach
may be the only way to preserve democracy in a dominant party state, and preserving
democracy is the essence of the South African Constitution.92 Without the protections
88. Id. at para. 189 (quoting Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para. 44).
89. Id. at para. 194.
90. Tuovinen, supra note 69, at 666–67. An article authored by Justice Cameron provided further rejoinders.

Cameron, supra note 68.

91.

Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at paras. 208–51. The vulnerability of the Hawks is not a mere abstraction.
See Masego Rahlaga, Hawks Boss’s Unlawful Suspension Overturned, Eyewitness News (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://ewn.co.za/2015/01/23/Anwa-Dramats-unlawful-suspension-overturned.
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of a fully independent entity, there is no reason to assume that the ANC will refrain
from engaging in more drastic actions to curtail opposition, including that of the
judicial branch.93 I say this with no view that the opposition parties are better, but
with the realization that absolute power can corrupt absolutely. Glenister II is already a
bellwether case that will help influence the various South African courts addressing
other corruption issues.94 The Constitutional Court’s insistence on the creation of a
truly independent agency is reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s support for the
practical necessity of a Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland.95 In each
case, the institution was not explicitly authorized by the respective constitution.
Numerous South African corruption cases are still pending. In late September of
2014, the South Gauteng High Court in Nkabinde v. Judicial Service Commission
ruled that the special judicial services tribunal investigating Judge Hlophe’s actions
was legitimate and could continue, contrary to the views and desires of Hlophe and
the two Constitutional Court Justices that Hlophe contacted.96 The Judicial Service
Commission had originally dismissed a complaint against Hlophe in 2009.97 Three
years later, however, the Commission decided to reinvestigate the matter pursuant to
an amended statute.98 The High Court rejected arguments that Hlophe was being
subjected to illegal retroactive punishment based on the new statutory provisions.99
The court said the statutory changes were mainly procedural and did not alter
Hlophe’s substantive rights.100 The court also rejected the argument that the
complaint in the earlier proceedings did not comply with the requirements of the
amended statute.101 One can see how the High Court was fighting a kind of legal
formalism—like that found in the Glenister II dissent—and how it was unwilling to
countenance easy excuses to avoid examining corruption. Unfortunately, the Hlophe
matter will be pursued to the Supreme Court of Appeal,102 meaning the public must
continue to wait and have Judge Hlophe serve under a cloud of uncertainty. But the

93. See, e.g., Karl Beck, South Africa: Democracy, Rule of Law, and the Future, Freedom House (Mar. 29,

2012), https://freedomhouse.org/blog/south-africa-democracy-rule-law-and-future (discussing the
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94. See generally Helen Suzman Found. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. (Glenister III) 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC).
95. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
96. 2014 (12) BCLR 1477 (GJ) at para. 121. It would seem that these Justices should have professional

ethical obligations to cooperate fully with the investigation.
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98. Id. at para. 37.
99. Id. at para. 121.
100. Id.
101. Id. at para. 122.
102. Rabkin, supra note 3.
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right to appeal is a price of justice. It is distressing, though, that the two Constitutional
Court Justices who were involved support the appeal.103
The Constitutional Court has also decided Glenister III.104 After Glenister II,
Parliament modified the statute governing the Hawks, but applicant Hugh Glenister
and the Helen Suzman Foundation, using much of Glenister II’s reasoning, argued
that this new entity is still not independent enough.105 In Glenister III, the
Constitutional Court agreed that the power of the Minister of Police to renew Hawk
employees’ positions and to suspend Hawk employees without pay for disciplinary
reasons compromised the entity’s independence.106
Even the Spy Tapes case, which may reveal why the Scorpions’ investigation into
Zuma’s financial dealings was halted, has not fully concluded, though the Democratic
Alliance finally got the tapes.107 There are apparently court limitations on the tapes’
usage.108 Nonetheless, the Democratic Alliance is now relying on new information to
seek reexamination of the decision not to charge Zuma.109 Interestingly, the National
Prosecuting Authority opposes this request.110
III. CONCLUSION

South Africa has been fortunate that higher courts have been brave, and that
judicial credibility does not yet seem too fragile to confront corruption, despite
attacks from the ANC. Indeed, a doctrinal paradox is that the South African courts
have, in these areas, apparently created greater judicial authority (just by adjudicating
cases, as opposed to labeling them a political question or dismissing on standing
grounds) than exists in the U.S. system, where the judiciary is often called “activist”
in the extreme.111 This shows that South African courts are taking a significant risk.
Hopefully a stronger South African anti-corruption agency can reduce pressure
on the courts. It is clear that the Constitutional Court’s reliance on international law
has been vital in bolstering the judicial battle against corruption and in limiting
ANC power. Great concerns, however, remain, as shown by the failure of the
Constitutional Court Justices to fully cooperate in the seemingly never-ending Judge
103. Id.; see also Franny Rabkin, Law Matters: The Other Side of the Bench, Bus. Day (Jan. 22, 2015), http://
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Hlophe controversy.112 There are also disputes about the money that Zuma has spent
“renovating” his mansion113 and allegations of a cover-up following the Marikana
massacre,114 in which police tragically killed thirty-four miners during a “wildcat”
strike.115 In the United States, the death of the Independent Counsel Act shows that
the American legal system is also struggling to figure out how to deal with highlevel corruption, though international law is far less relevant there and the problem is
far less serious. U.S. courts are nonetheless often criticized as being undemocratic.116
But in South Africa, the Constitutional Court is key to promoting real democracy
and negating corruption by limiting the dominant party.
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